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DETERMINING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOW TO REORGANIZE THE GUARD TO ACCOMPLISH THAT MISSION
Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security ---President George W. Bush
The horrific and unprecedented in scope terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to define the Amy National Guard's role in HLS. This discussion is framed by three critical assumptions. First, the attacks on 11 September highlighted the need for military units organized, trained and equipped specifically for HLS.
Secondly, it is unlikely the current Administration will advocate increased force structure; therefore, current DoD force structure must be used for HLS. Finally, the ARNG is the only component within the Army with forces not allocated to a specific warfighting mission. Though all elements of the Total Force to include the Reserve Components are key players in this mission, the scope of this paper is limited to the U.S. Amy National Guard only.
In order to frame the discussion on the Army Guard's role in HLS, it is important to first define what HLS is and is nok4 Secondly, define what the Amry's role is according to the draft Army HLS Planning Guidance and the Federal Emergency Response Plan. This will provide the ends that the Army Guard could perform. It will examine the capabilities (means) of the Army Guard using the current force structure metric, then assess the two courses of action (ways) recommended by the National Defense Panel and the Hart-Rudman Commission on the role of the Army Guard in HLS. Finally, it will conclude with recommendations on the best method to employ the Army Guard and some general force structure changes required to accomplish this.
Though the National Guard's role in HLS certainly includes the Air Guard, this paper will limit its scope solely to the role of the Army Guard and will encompass all potential mission sets except National Missile Defense (NMD).
DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY
The highest priority of the US. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law.
-2001 QDR
The responsibility of defending the homeland is currently shared by over forty federal agencies in addition to numerous state and local agencies.' The Department of Defense has yet to define what homeland security is or the missions and force structure required to accomplish those mission^.^ As Figure 1 illustrates, the Anser Institute for Homeland Secunty has provided a definition of the DoD components of Homeland Security sub-divided into the missions of civil support and homeland defense.' + .
S t 2 s
--
H o m e l a n d D e f e n s e : ( C o n v e n t i o n a I W a r t i m e M i s s i o n )
T h e p r e v e n t i o n , p r e e m p t i o n , a n d d e t e r r e n c e o f , a n d d e f e n s e a g a i n s t d i r e c t a t t a c k a i m e d a t U . S . T e r r i t o r y , p o p u l a t i o n , a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e D o D s u p p o r t t o C i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s f o r n a t u r a l a n d m a n m a d e d o m e s t i c e m e r g e n c i e s , c i v i l d i s t u r b a n c e s , a n d d e s i g n a t e d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t e f f o r t s traditions and values of service to our nation and communities.
H O M E L A N D S E C U R I T Y : ( s o n -c o n v e n t i o n a l W a r t i m e M i s s i o n )
T H E P R E V E N T I O N , D E T E R R E N C E , A N D P R E E M P T I O N O F , A N D D E F E N S E A G A I N S T , A G G R E S S I O N T A R G E T E D A T U . S , T E R R I T O R Y , S O V E R E I G N T Y , P O P U L A T I O N , A N D I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A S W E L L A S T H E M A N A G E M E N T O F T H E C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F S U C H A G G R E S S I O N A N D O T H E R D O M E S T I C E M E R G E N C I E S . (on our soil, b y o t h e r t h a n nation s t a t e s )
FIGURE 1. ELEMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY
-Army National Guard Vision 201 0
To understand the role the Army National Guard plays in HLS, it's necessary first to define the organization in terms of its current mission, organization and psychological roots.
DUAL MISSIONS
The National Guard is unique in that unlike the rest of the Army, it has both a Federal and State mission. The Guard is a federally funded and organized force, which is controlled by the Though the State mission (i.e.; HLS, consequence management in response to state emergencies, etc.) has been recognized since at least World War I, it has been treated as a secondary role. The primary role has been the task of ~arfighting.~~ The Guard's role as a combat force has had, and continues to have a major impact on how its leaders view the HLS mission in relation to its traditional roles as the combat reserve of the Army. Any signifiint change in the historical roles and missions will require a major paradigm shii in thinking.
Additionally, there will be an increased requirement for retraining time.28
COURSES OF ACTION
In determining viable courses of action, it is important to first state that many relevant The advantages of this course of action are that it provides the Army maximum flexibility to respond across the full spectrum of conflict with its current force structure. This spreads the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO throughout the force providing depth to ACIRC "first responders"
for any contingency across the spectrum of conflict, reducing risk. The NDP recommendation places emphasis on readiness across the force to insure the best response across the full spectrum of conflict, and as a means to reduce OPTEMPOPERSTEMPO. It also reduces the amount of reorganization and resulting costs in developing mission-specific forces. This course of action maintains the spitit of the Total Force Policy and reduces the possibility of conflict between the Army and its assigned reserve components. Finally, it assigns responsibility of HLS consequence management to one component within the Army.
The disadvantages of this course of action are that it may require expansion of Army, to include its Reserve Components, to meet the capabilities requirements as outlined in the QDR.
This could translate into a larger, more expensive force structure in which a component's capability could be limited to a reduced specific level of conflict. A result could be the partial conversion of the Army from a war-fighting force to a more constabulary type force with no dual mission capability. This could result in an increase in OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, reduction in the flexibility of the force, and produce a moderate risk. Wdh the Bush Administration's focus on maintaining current force structure levels, while increasing capability through transformation, any increase in force structure could further hamper the Army's fight for relevancy and resources.
Hart-Rudman Commission
The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that the National Guard be given HLS as its primary mission and be reorganized and equipped with upto-date equipment to accomplish that mission; that the National Guard redistribute resources that are currently allocated in preparing for the predominate mission of conventional war overseas to providing increased support to civil authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters, humanitarian relief, terrorism and particularly emergencies involving weap.ons of mass destruction and CBRNE incidents. The mission set would include assistance to local, state and regional planning for W E response, training and assistance to first responders; and planning and execution of inter-state support.
Concurrently, the commission recommends that DoD minimize forces with dual missions and reliance on active component forces that are detailed for major theater war. In conjunction with this reorganization of the Guard for HLS, the commission further recommends that the National Flexibility -the use of the current Army force structure metric to meet all requirements without increasing current OPTEMPOPERSTEMPO.
Total Force Policy -the a b i l i to provide a fully integrated, trained and equipped force with a common culture to provide unity of thought and action.
Risk -the ability to accomplish all required missions as outlined in the 2001 QDR with the current force structure with moderate to low risk.
Political Feasibility -reduces the possibility of conflict between the Army and its reserve components.
Cost -minimizes additional cost both in personnel, equipment and training allowing the Army to maintain its focus on transformation and modernization within projected budgets.
In comparing ability to increase HLS capability, it's obvious that the Hart-Rudman plan for a dedicated HLS force is the best option. The NDP option also provides for forces specifically trained for HLS, but many of these would be dual-mission forces potentially involved in SSCs and warfighting as well.
In terms of full spectrum operations and flexibility, the NDP plan insures the total Army is available for operations across the total spectrum of conflict providing decision makers with increased capability. The Hart-Rudman plan does provide forces capable of operations at the lower spectrum, but would limit the active Army to providing forces only for peace operations and all warfighting missions. Hart-Rudman also implies a loss of ARNG CSICSS forces needed to support the active Army if forces are not dual-missioned for both HLS and warfighting. With 56% of combat forces currently in the ARNG, the active force would have to be significantly increased to insure the Army can meet its requirements as outlined in the 2001 QDR. The training base would also need to be increased to train those low-density, high-demand specialties required for both HLS and warfighting.
If the National Guard's primary mission becomes HLS and the active Army and Army Reserve retain the warfighting mission as envisioned under Hart-Rudrnan, it could potentially lead to the development of two separate forces: a constabulary force for HLS, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping and a warfighting force for all other missions. This would have a negative impact on the current Total Force Policy. Additionally, cultural issues could lead to increased conflict between the Army and its reserve components over funding and other resource issues. Even as the importance of the HLS mission increases, the combat arms mission is so ingrained in the psyche and lineage of the ARNG that any significant reduction in this mission will most likely lead to serious political in-fighting within the Army. This in-fighting could tear the U.S. Army apart in the short term, and lead to long-term challenges affecting readiness and relevance. The Army could be the bill payer in the long run in relation to the other services that would not have the same challenges with their reserve components.
Establishing specific mission forces within the Army without significant increase in active force structure could increase the risk factor significantly if the Army must respond to SSCs, HLS and one or more W s simultaneously. Additionally, increases in force structure and the requisite retraining, reequipping and reorganizing of the ARNG for HLS might prove to be too cost prohibitive and have a negative impact on transformation. Finally, lack of sufficient funding could also increase current OPTEMPOPERSTEMPO, resulting in over reliance on an already overstretched force, and requiring limited budgets be spent on readiness instead of modernization.
ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMY GUARD -A RECOMMENDATION
Based on the comparison of the two courses of action using the criteria above, the NDP recommendation is the most viable option for accomplishing all the Army's mission requirements, especially HLS, and as a guide for the reorganization of the National Guard. 33 This leads to the following four specific recommendations:
That further study be conducted to determine the definition and specific parameters of the mission of HLS.
That further study be conducted to determine the specific force structure requirements for the total range of potential Army missions as outlined in the 2001 QDR to include the actual force requirements for HLS.
That DoD and Department of the Army adopt the National Defense Panel recommendation as to organization, roles and missions for the Army National Guard that allows mdmum flexibility across the full spectrum of operations.
That the Army National Guard retains designation as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief and that command and control of these operations are retained by the Adjutant Generals of the 54 states and territories.
REORGANIZING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TO BETTER PERFORM HOMELAND SECURITYIDEFENSE
A total force, fully integrated, requires a common culure to engender unity of thought and action. Shared operational and training experiences, common educational opportunities, and frequent exchange of leaders between the active and reserve components serve to deepen mutual respect and reinforce a common ethic.
-1 999 National Defense Panel Report
The first step to reorganizing the Army National Guard to better perform the Homeland Security/Defense mission begins with the clear understanding that any reorganization must take into account the full spectrum of conflict and how The Army" must transform its components collectively to accomplish all mission sets leading to the end state of a relevant, ready force. This o DoD will increase emphasis on combating terrorism training for federal, state and local responders, using the capab/lities of the National Guard and Reserve.
DoD has built its new defense strategy from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach, requiring a 'broad-portfolioa of military capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict, using the current force structure metric as the baseline for end-structure in the future.36
The lead agencies for all aspects of Homeland Security, except for land defense and National Missile Defense (NMD) remain with civilian agencies with the Department of Defense (DoD) in support.
Combat/CS/CSS assets of the ARNG will still be required to support the Army for overseas Major Theater War (w and Small Scale Contingencies (SSC).
HLS missions still need to be defined, but the most likely requirements are for military police, aviation, chemical, medical, engineer, transportation, information operations, civil affairs, and mortuary affairs units.37
Based on the 2001 QDR, little or no increase in Army force structure is expected.
Army transformation to include economies through out-sourcing and logistical reach-back will reduce some CSICSS requirements, though Army Division Redesign (ADRS) in the ARNG will continue at its current rate.
ARNG combat divisions will still be required as a base generation force, to support SSCs, Conversely, the disadvantages of this option are that it significantly reduces the Army's wmbat capability and the strategic reserve. With forces structured and organized specifically for HLS, it reduces the Army's forces available to respond across the spectrum of operations outside the U.S. especially mid and high intensity operations. To provide the best force within the resources available, the ARNG must complete ADRS Phases II and Ill as planned to provide the Army with the CSICSS forces it requires. Four ARNG divisions can be retained, manned with one traditional and two eSBs each. Add to the two integrated divisions the CSICSS to make these capable combat divisions, providing a total of six ARNG divisions from the original eight. The divisions will be responsible for the readiness and mobilization of their brigades with a goal of deploying the first battalion in 30 days or less and the remainder of the first brigade in 60 days or less. The goal for deploying the division should remain at 150 days or less per the RCE05 study. The ~7 8~ CAV Regiment would be retained as the only non-divisional eSB.
Finally, convert the remaining eight divisional combat brigades, three separate brigades and remaining divisional structure (120,000) to provide tailored forces for HLS. HLS becomes the primary mission (or third MTW) and has forces apportioned for that mission to the states and territories. Accept risk by dual missioning CSICSS assets with first priority HLS and second apportionment to the warfighting CINCs.
CONCLUSION
If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance even less.
--*en Eric Shinseki, CSA
The events of 11 September 2001 have provided a wake-up call as to the importap of defending the United States from attack. The Reserve Components, especially the National Guard, is without doubt the best military organization to support civilian authorities in planning for and responding to the issues of homeland security. The National Guard, with its current community Yonnmrd presence" and Ti t l e 32 status under command and control of the governor in peacetime, is the ideal force for the local-response required for homeland security.
The cornerstone of any reorganization or restructuring of the Army Guard is readiness; that is, readiness across the force. The readiness of all units across the force translates into the ability to support operations across the full spectrum of conflict, which for the Army and Army Guard alike, translates to relevance. As outlined in the 2001 QDR, this must be achieved under the current force levels and most likely without any major long-term increase in resources. This will require a concerted effort between the Army and its components, as well as across the sewices to achieve the nation's national security objectives. There must be willingness at every level of command;
throughout the services and their components; among political organizations; and at the local, state and nation level to work together to make these goals a reality.
WORD COUNT = 7,072 l2 Echevarria., 7-9. As LTC Echevarria notes, "...the Army's HLS missions span a broad spectrum. In addition, they take place in parallel with other activities reflected in the Army's Spectrum of Operations." The sooner DoD can define HLS missions and priorities, the sooner the Army can develop its mission plans and allocate resources. Crisis Management: Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, andlor resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to ads of terrorism;
State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management ispredominately a law enforcement response. [emphasis added] Based on the situation, a federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operation and by Federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently.
Consequence Management: Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required. 
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